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Summary 
In recent years an increasing amount of semi-structured data has 
become important to humans and programs.  XML promoted by 
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is rapidly emerging as 
the new standard language for semi-structured data 
representation and exchange on the Internet.  XML documents 
may contain private information that cannot be shared by all user 
communities. So securing XML data is becoming increasingly 
important and several approaches have been designed to protect 
information in a website. However, these approaches typically 
are used at file system level, rather than for the data in XML 
documents.  Usage control has been considered as the next 
generation access control model with distinguishing properties of 
decision continuity. Usage control enables finer-grained control 
over usage of digital objects than that of traditional access 
control policies and models.   
   
In this paper, we present a usage control model to protect 
information distributed on the web, which allows the access 
restrictions directly at DTD-level and XML document-level.   
Finally, comparisons with related works are analysed. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Over the past several years, there has been a tremendous 
surge of interest in XML as a universal, queryable 
representation for data. XML web service is a platform-
independent web application that accepts requests from 
different systems on the Internet. XML is a fundamental 
component in many XML web services and it is used to 
store and exchange data in the Internet environment that 
may include private messages of customers. It overcomes 
the complexity of SGML and the user can define 
document structures, removing the limit of the fixed tags 
in HTML. The following example displays customer’s 
information in a XML document.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
<xml version= “1.0” encoding= “UTF8”?> 
   <customerInfo xmlns= 
      “http://www.bookstore.com/BooksInfo”> 
     <bookstore city= “Toowoomba”> 
       <books> 
        <available>  
        <categorize> textbook </categorize> 
        <price >$22.00 </price > 
        <exercisebook> 
           <description > 
           <English comprehensive> 
           </description > 
           <price > $18.00 </price > 
        </exercisebook > 
        </available > 
        </sold > 
        <categorize >  
            magazine  
        </categorize> 
        <price > $30.00 </price> 
        <buyer>   
           <name > Tony </name > 
           <address> Jilan street, 5  
           </address> 
           <city> Toowoomba </city> 
        </buyer> 
        </sold> 
       </books> 
      </bookstore> 
    </customerInfo> 
 
Table 1: XML Document Example 
 
XML documents not only show the content of data but 
also the constraints and relationships between data. In 
Table 1, the element customerInfo includes bookstore, and 
books sub-elements. The sub-element available is a simple 
type while sub-elements model and price are combined 
with their own sub-elements. Since an XML document can 
express complex relationship between data, it may be 
generated from various resources with varying security 
requirements. In some situations a user may like to access 
the particular parts of an XML document. In the above 
example, for the textbook objects everyone can read all 
information. However, some users' access to information 
such as sold and buyer will be restricted. This is because 
when an internal or external user accesses this document, 
his/her access permission has to be limited according to 
security policies in all databases.  This example shows that 
secure XML documents form a significant topic for 
research.  
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In general, we identify two levels, instance and DTD (the 
Document Type Definition) at which authorizations on 
XML documents can be defined. XML documents and 
DTDs naturally support two levels of authorization. 1). 
Low-level authorizations, associated with XML 
documents, providing full control of authorizations on a 
document by document basis; 2). High-level 
authorizations, associated with XML DTDs, providing 
structure and element declarations of access permissions. 
Different requirements may have call for the support of 
access restrictions at the level of each specific document 
[2]. In the access control model the central authority uses 
XML DTDs to specify the format of information to be 
changed. 
 
Several approaches have been designed for the security of 
XML documents [5, 6, 14]. But all these approaches have 
some limitations.  Encryption and decryption skills [14] 
focus on the protection at the file level not on a systematic 
level. They are used in protection of communications 
between servers and clients rather than dissemination from 
clients. Traditional access control models primarily 
consider static authorization decisions based on the 
subjects' permissions on target objects, they have used on 
the control of access to server-side objects. From these 
models they present a similar approach in the work: a 
security administrator defines a set of policies at document 
level or DTD level. Through access control, the system 
can restrict unauthorizatied users access to the resources in 
the system and guarantee the confidentiality and integrity 
of the resources. On the other hand, traditional 
authorization decisions are generated at request time but 
do not consider ongoing controls for long access or for 
revocation. Recently proposed usage control [16] is a new 
access control model extending traditional access control 
models in multiple aspects. The main different properties 
of usage control with traditional access control models are 
continuity of access decision and mutability of subject 
attributes and object attributes. 
 
In this paper, we propose authorization models which 
adopt usage control to manage access both at the instance-
level and at the schema-level. Following traditional access 
control given an access request, an algorithm computes a 
view of the target XML document based on the user's 
requirements right.  It has analysed authorization decisions 
on a subject's access to target resources before access. In 
usage access control authorization decisions are not only 
checked and made before access, but also are repeatly 
checked during the access period. It may revoke access 
permission according to the changes of the subject or 
object attributes. Meanwhile obligations and conditions 
become decision factors for the management of XML 
documents. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 illustrates the background of XML and DTD 
level authorizations.  Section 3 presents the usage control 
model.  Three decision factors: Authorization, Obligations, 
Conditions and Continuity properties pre and  ongoing are 
introduced in this section. Section 4 shows our proposed 
authorization models for usage control. It includes pre-
Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, 
ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-
Conditions. Section 5 concludes the paper and outlines our 
future work. 
 
2.  Related technologies 
 
2.1 DTD and XML documents  
 
XML [3] is a markup language for describing semi-
structured information. An XML document consists of 
elements, attributes and text nodes, each delimited by a 
pair of start and end tags (e.g. <price> and </price>) or by 
an empty tag. The content of each element is a sequence of 
elements or text nodes. An element has a set of attributes, 
each of which has a name and a value.  XML document 
can be classified into two categories: well-formed and 
valid.  A document is said to be well-formed if it follows 
the grammar rules of XML, such as there is exactly one 
element that completely contains all other elements, 
elements may nest but not overlap, etc. A well-formed 
document is valid only if it contains a proper DTD in the 
source and if the document obeys the constraints of that 
declaration. Validation requires an XML instance to 
contain specified elements and attributes, following 
specified datatypes and relationships.  
 
Document Type Definition (DTD) and XML Schema are 
two main validation specification mechanisms.  A DTD is 
a file which contains a formal definition of a particular 
type of XML document.  A DTD consists of two parts: the 
element declarations and the attributes declarations. 
Elements are the most important components of an XML 
document.  Element declarations in the DTD specify the 
names of elements and their contents.  They also describe 
sub-elements and their cardinality.  Attributes represent 
properties of elements. Attribute declarations specify the 
attributes of each element, including their name, type, etc. 
Attributes can be marked as required, implied, or fixed.  
Attributes with require must have an explicit value for 
each occurrence of the associated elements.  Attributes 
with implied are optional. Attributes with fixed have a 
fixed value.  Entities are used to include texts and binary 
data.  Notations specify how to manage entities and binary 
data.  Entities and notations are not considered in this 
paper since both of them are used to describe the physical 
structure of an XML document.   
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However, the XML documents corresponding to a DTD 
must obey a structure defined by that DTD. Each DTD is a 
schema and XML documents corresponding to that DTD 
are instances of that schema. But the DTD structure is not 
restricted. For instance, two different XML documents 
with the same schema may widely differ in the elements.  
As a well-formed XML document is in nested structure, 
there are some languages (e.g., XHTML and XML DOM) 
which are applied to locate elements with patterns. An 
XML document can be generated from various resources 
to fit applications with different structures.  These main 
aspects about XML are discussed in [8]. The example 
below in Table 2 displays an  XML DTD for  a 
corresponding valid XML document in Table 1. 
 
<?xml version= “1.0”  encoding= “UTF-8”? >   
      <xs:annotation>  
           <xs:documentation>  
                Customer Information Instance 
           </xs:documentation>  
      </xs:annotation>  
     <xs:ELEMENT bookstore (book+)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT books (available*, sold*)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT available (catalog, price, 
                                          exercisebook*, buyer)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT sold (categorize, price, buyer)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT exercisebook (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT buyer (name, address, city, discount?)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT categorize (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT price (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT description (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT name (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT address (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT city (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ELEMENT discount (PCDATA)>  
     <xs:ATTLIST bookstore city CDATA #REQUIRED> 
  
Table 2: XML DTD Example 
  
2.2 Usage control  
 
The traditional access control method normally deals only 
with authorization decisions on users' access to target 
resources. The usage control is a generalization of access 
control. It enriches and refines the access control 
discipline in its definition. There are eight core 
components in the usage control model: subjects, subject 
attributes, objects, object attributes, rights, authorizations, 
obligations, and conditions [16, 20] (see Figure1). In the 
usage control model, subjects and objects are familiar 
concepts with traditional access control. A right represents 
access of a subject to an object, such as read or write.  The 
existence of the right is determined when the access is 
attempted by the subject. Obligations and conditions are 
new concepts that can resolve certain shortcomings that 
have been in traditional access controls. Obligations are 
requirements that have to be fulfilled by obligation 
subjects for allowing access. Conditions are subject and 
object independent environmental or system requirements 
that have to be satisfied for access.  
 
 
 
Fig.1 Components of Usage Control Model 
 
The usage decision functions indicated in Figure1 make 
this determination based on subject attributes, object 
attributes, authorizations, obligations and conditions at the 
time of usage requests.  
 
Subjects, objects, and rights can be divided into detailed 
components with different perspectives. A subject can be a 
user, a group, a role, or a process. In the usage control 
model, the subjects can be consumer subjects (CS), 
provider subject (PS), and identifier subjects (IS).  Objects 
are entities that subjects hold rights on, whereby the 
subjects can access or use objects. Rights are privileges 
that subjects can hold on objects. The authorization of 
rights requires associations with subjects and objects.  
 
Subject and object attributes can be used during the access 
decision process.  Subject attributes are identities, group 
names, roles, memberships, security clearance and so on. 
An online shopping buyer, an university student in 
management system can both be subjects. Object attributes 
associated with objects are security labels, ownerships, 
classes, access control lists and so on. For instance, in an 
on-line shopping store, a price could be an object attribute, 
the electron blood pressure is priced at $120 and with 
delivery is required at $135. 
 
Authorizations, obligations and conditions are decision 
factors used to check and determine whether a subject 
should be allowed to access an object. Authorizations are 
based on subject and object attributes and the specific 
right. Authorizations can be either pre-authorization (preA) 
or ongoing-authorization(onA). Pre-authorization is 
performed before authorization is required to the access. 
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In general, the authorization of most traditional access 
controls are assumed to be done before access is allowed 
(pre). But ongoing authorization may be performed during 
the access, such as when a book stocking list in a 
bookstore is periodically checked while the access is in 
progress. An access is immediately revoked if the relevant 
item's number becomes 0 when it appears on the list. 
However, it is quite reasonable to extend this for 
continuous enforcement by evaluating usage requirements 
throughout usages (ongoing). Authorizations may require 
updates on subject and object attributes. These updates can 
be either `pre', `ongoing', or `post' and are called 
“continuity properties”. Figure 2 shows the continuity 
properties in usage control model. 
 
  
Fig.2 Continuity Properties of Usage Control 
 
Obligations are requirements that a subject must perform 
before (pre) or during (ongoing) accesses. An example of 
a pre-obligation is the requirement that a user must 
provide some contact and personal information before 
accessing IEEE digital library. The requirement that a user 
has to keep certain advertising windows open while he is 
accessing some service, is an example of an ongoing 
obligation. Subject and object attributes can be used to 
decide what kind of obligations are required for access 
approval.  
 
Conditions are decision factors that depend on 
environmental and system-oriented requirements. Subject 
and object attributes can be used to select which condition 
requirements have to be used for a request. For example,  
IEEE member can access full papers in the IEEE digital 
library. They can also include the security status of the 
system, such as low level, normal, high alert.  
 
3. Authorization models  
 
In this section we consider authorization models for the 
DTD and XML documents adopting usage control. Based 
on the involvement of three decision factors: 
authorizations, obligations, and conditions, we develop 
models for usage control which consider on enforcement. 
We assume that a usage request exists on an XML target 
object. Decision-making can be done either before (pre) or 
during (ongoing) exercise of the requested right. Decision-
making after the usage has no influence on the decision of 
current usage.  Based on the requirements we have six 
possible cases as a model for usage control: pre 
Authorizations, ongoing-Authorizations, pre-Obligations, 
ongoing-Obligations, pre-Conditions and ongoing-
Conditions. Depending on the access requirements on the 
DTD and XML documents in the real world, it is possible 
to utilize more than one case. In this paper, we consider 
only the” cases consisting of Authorizations, Obligations 
or Conditions alone with pre or ongoing decisions. 
Meanwhile we focus on developing the usage control 
models for the DTD and XML documents. 
 
A.  Usage control for pre-Authorization Model 
UCM_preA: 
 
In a pre-Authorization usage control model, the decision 
process is performed before access is allowed.  Consider 
the XML DTD and XML documents in Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. The following illustration of usage decision that 
can be expressed on the documents DTD level and 
instance level are made in pre-authorizations. 
 
The UCM_preA model consists of the following 
components: S, XDTD, XD, R, R1, ATT(S), ATT(XDTD), 
ATT(XD) and  usage decision Boolean functions preA, 
preA_1 on XDTD, XD,  respectively, where S, XDTD, 
XD, R, R1 represent Subject, XML DTD, XML document 
and Rights required on XML DTD level and XML 
document respectively.  ATT(S), ATT(XDTD), ATT(XD) 
represent attributes of subjects, XML DTD and XML 
document respectively.   preA and preA_1 are predicates 
about authorization functions.   
For example, consider the XML DTD and the XML 
document in Figure 1 and Figure 2: 
preA in DTD level is applicable to all bookstores.  
D1: Information about the available books is publicly 
accesible for every reader. 
D2: Information about the price sold books is only 
accesssible by administrative staff. 
D3: The original price of books is not publicly accessible. 
preA_1 in instance level is applicable to a bookstore in 
Toowoomba. 
L1: The price of sold books is only accessible by members 
of financial staff. 
L2: Tony can access information about books but those 
books that have been discounted and sold in other cities. 
     
1. allowed (s, xdtd, r) ⇒   preA(ATT(s), ATT(xdtd), r), 
    where A ⇒  B means B is a necessary condition for A.   
In this example this predicate indicates that if subject S 
    is allowed to access XML DTD level xdtd with right r 
    then the indicated condition preA must be match D1, 
D2, 
D3. 
 
2. allowed (s, xd, r1)⇒   
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                    preA_1(ATT(s), ATT(xd), r1). 
In this example the allowed (s, xdl, r1) predicate  
    indicates that if subject s is allowed to access XML 
document xd with right r1 then the decision function  
preA_1 must be matched  with L1 and L2. 
 
The UCM_preA model provides an authorization method 
on whether a subject can access the XML DTD level and 
Instance level document. The allowed(s, xdtd, r) predicate 
shows that subject s can access information in the XML 
DTD level document. The allowed(s, xd, r1) predicate 
shows that subject S can access information in XML 
documents.  At this process, private information in XML 
DTD and corresponding XML documents are restricted. 
 
 
B. Usage control for ongoing Authorizations Model        
UCM_onA: 
 
A usage control model for ongoing-Authorizations model 
is used to check ongoing authorizations during access 
processes. In this model, usage requests are allowed 
without any ‘pre’ decision making.  
 
The UCM_onA  model has the following components: 
S, XDTD, XD, R, R1, ATT(S), ATT(XDTD), ATT(XD) 
as before, and  ongoing usage decision functions onA on 
XDTD (XML DTD level) and  onA_1 on XD (XML 
document). 
onA and onA_1 are used to check whether S can continue 
to access or not. 
1. allowed (s, xdtd, r) ⇒  true, 
    This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on xdtd. 
 
2. allowed (s, xd, r1) ⇒  true,  
    This is a prerequisite for ongoing authorization on xd. 
 
3. stopped (s, xdtd, r)⇐  ┐onA(ATT(s), ATT(xdtd), r), 
The access of subject s to xdtd is terminated if the   
ongoing authorization onA is failed. 
 
4. stopped (s, xd, r1)⇐   
           ┐ onA_1(ATT(s), ATT(xd), r1). 
The access of subject s to xd is terminated if the 
ongoing    
authorization onA_1 is failed. 
 
In this model usage decision Boolean function  are onA, 
onA_1 instead of preA, preA1. During this process the 
requested access is always allowed as there is no pre-
authorization all the time. allowed (s, xdtd, r) and allowed 
(s, xd, r1) are required to be true, otherwise ongoing 
authorization should not be initiated. Ongoing 
authorizations are active throughout the usage of the 
requested right, and some requirements are repeatedly 
checked for continued access. These checks are performed 
periodically based on time or event. In the process when 
attributes are changed and requirements are no longer 
satisfied, stopped procedures are performed. Stopped (s, 
xdtd, r) and stopped (s, xd, r1) indicate that rights r and r1 
of subject s on object XML DTD and XML document are 
revoked and the ongoing access terminated. For example, 
a limited number of simultaneous usage, suppose only two 
administration staff can access information about the price 
sold books in an object XML DTD level simultaneously. 
If a third  administration staff requests access and pass the 
pre-authorization, the staff with the earlier time access is 
terminated. While this is a case of ongoing authorizations, 
it is important that the certificate should be evaluated in a 
pre decision. 
  
C. Usage control for pre-Obligations Model UCM_preB: 
 
UCM_preB introduces pre-obligations that have to be 
fulfilled before access is permitted. It will return true or 
false for usage decision depending on whether obligation 
actions have been fulfilled or not. This model consists of 
two steps: the first is to select required obligation elements 
for the requested usage, and then to evaluate whether the 
selected obligation elements have been fulfilled or not. 
Examples of pre-obligations are requiring a reader to 
register by filling forms before accessing online reading, 
and requiring a reader to click the ACCEPT box on a 
license agreement to read some books online. The pre-
obligation action may perform on a different object (e.g., 
register, license agreement) that the reader is trying to 
access (e.g., e-book). It means that the pre-obligation 
action may be done by some other subject.  Hence 
obligation subjects, objects, and actions are added in the 
following UCM_ preB model.  
 
The following model is described for XML DTD level and 
XML documents.  It can be used for restricted information 
in XML DTD or in the XML documents. 
The UCM_preB model has the following components: 
 S, XDTD, XD,  R,  ATT(S), ATT(XDTD) and ATT(XD) 
are as before, OBS, OBO and OB represent obligation 
subjects, objects, and actions, respectively; decision 
function preObfilled : OBS × OBO × OB → {true, false}, 
As mentioned above, subject S and access object XDTD, 
XD may be different from OBS and OBO.  
The function preObfilled(s, xdtd, r) and preObfilled(s, xd, 
r) are used to check if obligations are obeyed or not before 
the subject(s) accesses the object(xdtd, or xd).     
 
1. allowed(s, xdtd, r) ⇒   preObfilled(s, xdtd, r). 
The preObfilled(s, xdtd, r) function must be true if 
subject(s) is allowed to access xdtd with right r.  
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2. allowed(s, xd, r)  ⇒  preObfilled(s, xd, r) . 
The preObfilled(s, xd, r) function must be true if s is  
allowed to access xd with right r.  
 
This model indicates that obligations have to be fulfilled 
before s can access xdtd or xd. Note that each obligation 
has to be true if there are more than two obligations. 
 
D. Usage control for ongoing-Obligations Model 
UCM_onB: 
 
Similar to pre-Obligations, Obligations are required to 
fulfill in UCM_onB models while rights are exercised. 
Ongoing-obligations may have to be fulfilled periodically 
or continuously. For example, when a reader accesses an 
e-book through the Internet within every 15 web pages, 
the reader may have to open an advertisement window. 
Alternatively, the reader may leave an advertisement 
window active all the time with inconvenience.  The 
model concerns obligations that have to be fulfilled. 
 
The UCM_onB model has the following components: 
 S, XDTD, XD,  R,  ATT(S), ATT(XDTD) and ATT(XD) 
as before,  OBS, OBO, and OB represent obligation 
subjects, objects, and actions, respectively; an ongoing 
decision function   onObfilled : OBS × OBO ×OB→  
{true, false}. The ongoing function preObfilled(s, xdtd, r) 
and preObfilled(s, xd, r) are used to check if obligations 
are continually obeyed or not during subject(s) access 
object(xdtd or xd). 
  
1. allowed(s, xdtd, r)⇒ true ,  
A prerequisite for UCM_onB. It means that s is  
accessing XML DTD. 
 
2. allowed(s, xd, r) ⇒  true,  
A prerequisite for UCM_onB. It means that s is  
accessing XML document. 
       
3. stopped (s, xdtd, r) ⇐┐onObfilled(s, xdtd, r). 
 
4. stopped (s, xd, r) ⇐  ┐onObfilled(s, xd, r). 
 
Where stopped (s, xdtd, r) indicates that the access of s on 
xdtd with r is revoked if the ongoing obligations fail. 
Alternatively, stopped (s, xd, r) indicates that the access of 
s on xd with r is revoked if the ongoing obligations fail. 
 
E. Usage control for pre-Conditions Model UCM_preC: 
 
As described earlier, conditions define that certain 
restrictions have to be satisfied for usages. Conditions are 
not directly related to subjects and objects since they 
define environmental and system restrictions.  By using 
conditions in usage decision processes, it can provide 
finer-grained controls on usage. We focus on this model 
on XML DTD and XML documents.  The pre-conditions 
model has to be used before requested rights are exercised. 
For example, suppose there are some requirements to 
restrict times for reading papers, such as papers can be 
read 5 times, print 3 times. You then should check them 
before a usage allowed. 
 
The UCM_preC model has the following components: 
 S, XDTD, XD, R, ATT(S), ATT(XDTD) and ATT(XD) 
as before,  preCON (a set of pre-conditions), verify 
conditions function preConSatisfied: preCON →  {true, 
false}, The function preConSatisfied is used to check 
whether the pre-conditions are satisfied or not.  
 
1.preC(s, xdtd, r) = 
∧ preCon_i ∈preCON preConSatisfied(preCon_i),or 
 
2. preC(s, xd, r) =  
         ∧ preCon_i ∈preCONpreConSatisfied(preCon_i).  
All pre-conditions have to be checked if there are more  
than two conditions. 
  
3. allowed(s, xdtd, r)⇒ preC(s, xdtd, r), or 
 
4. allowed(s, xd, r) ⇒ preC(s, xd, r). 
 
where allowed(s, xdtd, r) and allowed(s, xd, r) express that 
all conditions have to be satisfied before access is 
approved. 
 
F. Usage control for ongoing-Conditions Model 
UCM_onC:  
 
UCM_onC model requires conditions to be satisfied while 
rights are in active use. If violating any of the restrictions, 
the allowed right is revoked and the exercised is stopped.  
For example, realOne player does not work when 
Windows XP system works on safety module. 
 
The UCM_onC model has the following components: 
S, XDTD, XD, R, ATT(S), ATT(XDTD) and ATT(XD) 
as before, onCON (a set of ongoing conditions), verify 
ongoing conditions elements. 
onConSatisfied: onCON → {true, false}.  
The function onConSatisfied is used to check whether 
ongoing conditions are satisfied or not.  
 
1. onC(s, xdtd, r) =  
       ∧ onCon_i ∈ onCONon ConSatisfied(onCon_i), or 
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2. onC(s, xd, r) =  
        ∧  onCon_i ∈ onCON onConSatisfied(onCon_i),  
     All ongoing conditions are required to be checked. 
 
3. allowed(s, xdtd, r) ⇒ true, or 
 
4. allowed(s, xd, r) ⇒  true, 
    A prerequisite for UCM_onC. 
 
5. stopped (s, xdtd, r) ⇐┐onC(s, xdtd, r). 
 
6. stopped (s, xd, r) ⇐  ┐onC(s, xd, r). 
 
In practice, the above six models may need to be 
combined for an access control. We obtain an 
authorization method for XML DTD and XML documents 
and their elements by checking users' (subjects') 
authorizations, obligations and conditions with continuity 
properties. 
 
4. Conclusions and future work  
 
In this paper we introduce DTD, XML, usage control and 
discuss access models for XML DTD and XML 
documents by using usage control. Usage control models 
provide an approach for the next generation of access 
control.  We analyse not only decision factors in usage 
control, such as authorizations, obligations and conditions, 
but also the continuity properties.  This paper also 
illustrates six different kinds of models built for XML 
DTD and XML documents. In addition, the work in this 
paper has significantly extended previous work, such as 
the ongoing continuity for authorizations, obligations and 
conditions in usage control for XML DTD and XML 
documents.   The methods presented in this paper can be 
used to control XML documents in a dynamic 
environment.  It also begins a new application with usage 
control.   
  
Obviously, there is an increasing realization that 
traditional access control is not adequate for modern 
application needs. This paper represents only a first step 
for DTD level authorization in XML documents with 
usage control, and much work is still to be done before 
these models can be used in practice.    
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